![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
||||||||||||||||||
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
|||||||||||||||
![]() |
![]() |
||||||||||||||||||
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
University Teachers for
Human Rights (Jaffna)
Sri Lanka
UTHR(J)
4. The International Community and
Killings
5. The Sooriyamoorthy Assassination
6. Killings, Some Salient Features
7. LTTE Murders of a Criminal
Nature
8. Murders of Government Officers
Involved in Relief Work
9. LTTE attacks on tsunami refugees
10. Killings of persons associated
with opposition groups and relatives
11. Killings Associated with Sri
Lankan Intelligence
13. The Batticaloa Imbroglio and
Killings Connected with the Karuna-Vanni Split
14. The Danger of lumping all
killings into the LTTE vs. Paramilitary Rubric
Ordinary Tamils in the areas unaffected by escalating
violence between the LTTE Vanni faction and Karuna’s forces cling to the hope
that somehow the “normalcy” resulting from three years without open warfare can
be maintained. They are beyond caring about how the absence of war is sustained
as long as they are left alone. After
two decades of being wedged in between armed forces, the notion that they could
have a real democratic voice in their future seems absurd. And yet it is this very lack of voice which
will doom any peace effort. Even at a basic humanitarian level, the North-East
of Sri Lanka is unique among tsunami-hit regions for the systematic violence
resorted to by supposed representatives for draconian control over aid and the
victims.
Members of the Tamil dissident community who continue to
demand an independent voice are on death row and the pressure is
unbearable. They exist in the shadows
and in isolation, never sure who among them the next bullet would claim. They, of all people in the Tamil community,
are most acutely aware of the dangers of legitimising the LTTE’s fascist
impulses. They recognise that the normalcy that comes with the absence of war
cannot be sustained if we do not address the underlying factors that will
inevitably regenerate the war: public
alienation, violations of human rights and assaults on human dignity, and
impunity. We urge all those committed to peace in Sri Lanka not to compromise
on human rights and to press for a mechanism that would help the people make
such rights a reality.
Mid-morning on 24th April LTTE gunmen on a
motorcycle fired wildly on a religious festive procession in Batticaloa,
injuring the chief trustee and apparent target Rasamanickam Mathiyalahan (31),
who had trouble with the LTTE over tsunami relief, along with another civilian.
Also injured were the children Miss. Suhanya Ravichandran (13) and Miss.
Nithyananthana Jeganathan (12). On 9th June the LTTE fired at the
Chenkalady EPDP leader Ravi and his army escort from behind the cover of the
auto rickshaw belonging to Karunamoorthy, whom the LTTE assassins had forced to
drive them there. Ravi and two from his escort were injured, while the rickshaw
driver was killed. (Details in Appendix.)
It is well known in Batticaloa that the LTTE has killers
constantly on the alert to strike when an opportunity arises. The Batticaloa
police have the names of four individuals responsible for local hits,
originating from Palugamam, Puthur, Vaharai, Pankudaveli and Kothiavalai . One
of these men has also been used for killings in Colombo (e.g. PLOTE
Mohan). The killers are summoned for
the kill by spies who observe the target and choose the moment. Spies functioning under LTTE intelligence
also keep a close eye on the tsunami refugee camp at Arasady and have been
associated with the murder of breadwinners of three tsunami families. Although these individuals are known to the
authorities the police have not forwarded these reports to the Sri Lankan
Monitoring Mission.
UTHR(J) is particularly concerned about the safety of key
Tamil political figures with diverse histories advocating democratic change.
Among them is Mr. V. Anandasangari, the senior most Tamil leader with
unimpeachable democratic credentials.
By July, the threat he faced had become very intense. His key lieutenant
Mr. Sooriyamoorthy, former mayor of Trincomalee, was killed two months ago. As
always, the roots of the LTTE’s resort to extreme violence are internal.
The LTTE’s handling of the Karuna split, although presented
initially as a victory for the Vanni leadership, seems to have caused a chain
reaction of dissension. The full extent
of the discord is not known, but reflexive institutional actions meant to
maintain control have had the opposite effect, bringing about open public
displays of discontent, some of them in the North itself.
The LTTE’s handling of the Jeyadevan affair was a diplomatic
disaster, demonstrating to overseas Tamil sympathisers that its greed and
ruthlessness would pay no heed to their social standing or services they
rendered. A strike action of mini van
drivers in Jaffna is one instance of spontaneous public reaction from
accumulated anger. A rebellion by a group of villagers in Mullaitivu after a
traffic accident resulted in a reported 45 persons being detained by the LTTE
Police. Indiscipline in the lower ranks is also evident in more reports of
criminal action for private gain, such as the murder of Rajadurai Thangarajah
of Udupiddy to take over his land. Escapees and other sources have reported the
LTTE holding hundreds for suspected political dissent in large bunker prisons
in the Vanni and Veppavedduvan, Batticaloa.
Although people in the North have seen some semblance of
normalcy after the ceasefire agreement was signed and economic activity resumed,
the LTTE’s continuous manipulation of the local structures is a worrying sign
for those who know the dynamics of the present peace process. When people openly say “things are normal in
Jaffna, we can buy as many things as in Colombo,” they will add: “I hope these guys do not start the
war”. People live with a hope that the
LTTE will not start the war. Beyond
that there is little they believe they could do to organise themselves to
prevent it, or to insist on other means to achieve a political solution. They
are voiceless, directionless and have few expectations.
In this scenario analysing the benefit from the CFA on mere
economic indicators may not serve any purpose as the other indicators, which
could measure the political space and people’s ability to influence the
process, are all in the negative and deteriorating.
In the past when the LTTE had been cornered into accepting
something that would place its political record under scrutiny, its reaction
internally was to eliminate all prospect of dissent. This political reality of ideological intolerance is the key,
the Rosetta stone, which unravels much that has gone wrong in Sri Lanka in the
last 20 years.
The logic of appeasement is now in its final throes. While
the Government was utterly cynical about Tamil democracy, Tamil lives and Tamil
dissent, it at least tried to keep up appearances to the donor community. The
LTTE long ago stopped even keeping up appearances, but others pretended not to
notice. Today child conscription has reached its crudest extremes in full view.
On 12th July, a youth was bound and blasted with
a grenade in Chenkalady after public alarm forced the LTTE to release several
children it had abducted (see Appendix). Tsunami refugees in the East are being
arm twisted to part with their children by threats to withhold relief. While
threatening to start war claiming that is what the people want from the LTTE,
the hapless people who desperately do not want war are being dragooned into a
“border force’.
A measure of the desperation the LTTE must now feel, and an
indication of whose interest and survival really matters to the organisation,
is reflected in the LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman’s statement transmitted
worldwide on Black Tiger Day, 5th July 2005: “The ultimate
longings for which the Black Tigers left this world are freedom and the
National Leader’s protection.” Pottu quoted the Leader, “I created the
Black Tigers as the potent weapon of our feeble race.” Pottu closed with a
call to the worldwide Tamil community to flock behind the banner of the nation
to strengthen their technological, financial and military edge to render
effective ‘the victories attainable by the suicide of the Black Tigers’.
Many
left political parties and NGO activists who once got assistance from the State
to arm themselves during the heyday of the JVP killing spree, now without
hesitation use the word paramilitary to describe the LTTE’s opponents. The
state did use people left from these groups as paramilitaries when it served
their mutual interests, and the LTTE also functioned as a paramilitary group
during the IPKF period when the Sri Lankan government wanted to force the
Indians out.
It
is important to look at the logic of LTTE terror and at its denial of space for
independent activism to understand how at various points groups were cornered
into serving the State’s interests as paramilitary forces. It is also important to recognise that
evidence for significant sections of Tamil groups threatened by the LTTE
functioning in this way in the current context is very thin. And if they are,
it is because the process has left them no other option. (The case of the
Karuna faction is discussed below.) If
the peace process were actually geared towards creating political space then we
would have seen a reduction in political killings and halt to forcible child
recruitment. Instead it has been about
marginalising any challenge to the simple binary relationship of the two
negotiating parties.
The donor Co-chairs in a statement released by the US
embassy on 13th June made room for the same kind of manipulation,
giving the LTTE no decisive reason to restrain itself: “The Co-chairs call
on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to stop assassinations,
including of individuals such as Tamil informants, members of other Tamil
groups and political parties and government and military officials, and to stop
the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Co-chairs likewise call on the
Sri Lankan government to take decisive action to ensure that killings are
stopped and paramilitaries are disarmed immediately as required in the
Cease-Fire Agreement.”
The Co-chairs released a second, more urgently worded
statement on July 19th, warning that international support for the
peace process would be “deeply eroded” if the cease-fire failed. They called on the LTTE to “stop all
killings by their forces”, and the Sri Lankan government to “guarantee
the security of unarmed LTTE cadres in government controlled areas.”
and “ensure that all paramilitary
groups are disarmed and prevented from any activity that might lead to violence.”
We are still left with the question, who exactly are these
paramilitaries that the government is supposed to have sufficient influence
over to disarm?
Until he died Sooriyamoorthy was a frequent caller at Mr.
Anandasangary’s home in Colombo where he used to help with office work. Though
warned by friends, he did not take the LTTE threat seriously enough as it had
no pretext for branding him a traitor. The controversy over the overnight
erection of a new Buddha statue led to tension and a shutdown of Trincomalee on
Tuesday 17th May. In the evening of the very next day,
Sooriyamoorthy was shot at his home and injured. He was airlifted to Colombo
for emergency surgery and died a week later as the shooting had damaged his
liver.
On the very day Sooriyamoorthy was shot, Nitharsanam.com with close links to LTTE intelligence announced that he had been attacked by government, majoritarian Buddhist fanatics. This was initially believed even by persons close to Sooriyamoorthy. But there were witnesses who could testify to the contrary – relatives and neighbors who saw and heard the assault. It soon got out that
four
young men on motor cycles had arrived at his house on the night of the attack,
and asked him to come with them to discuss a business deal. Sooriyamoorthy was reportedly suspicious and
refused. When his assailants tried to physically force him outside, there was a
struggle.. The
killers panicked, shot him in the abdomen and thigh and ran away, leaving him
injured. The hero supposedly killed by Sinhalese fanatics became an
embarrassment to the LTTE. When he died there were tell-tale virtual admissions
by the killers. The Tamil Sakthy TV where his daughter Sooriyaprabha worked
failed to announce his death. The London-based LTTE-run IBC Radio described
Sooriyamoorthy as a man castaway (thrown) and rejected by the people, in
reference to the elections mercilessly rigged by the LTTE.
The climax came in a statement claiming responsibility for Sooriyamoorthy’s murder, dated 27th May, printed in the Uthayan and other LTTE-controlled media and supposedly faxed to them, claiming to have come from a Seralathan, writing as spokesman for the Tamil National Army associated with Karuna. The statement claimed that Sooriyamoorthy was killed because he was a spy for the LTTE Vanni group. The allegedly Karuna statement was publicised exclusively in the media of his enemy. Even more curiously, the statement gave its address as Pandivirichchan, Vavuniya, a solidly LTTE-controlled area in the Vanni! That is also a statement of affairs within the LTTE.
It is dishonest to pretend that
these are killings between the LTTE and paramilitaries that one can do nothing
about. Every murder gives out its secrets under scrutiny. Even Sooriyamoorthy
had been reduced in death to a paramilitary, this time a paramilitary of the
LTTE, as if that made his murder less of an issue. It was a calculated and
resounding attack on democracy, aided by the hullabaloo created over the statue
by friends in need - Buddhist extremists.
Iqbal Athas reported (Sunday
Times 10 Jul.05): “Rear Admiral Weerasekera, according to a report from a
state intelligence agency, had addressed a gathering of three wheeler scooter
taxi drivers who are known to be responsible for placing the statue.” The
Rear Admiral who was moved out of Trincomalee by the President later denied the
charge, but the intense security in the eastern town would not have permitted
the erection of the statue without the connivance of the security forces. In
Trincomalee, the minorities have felt the heavy hand of discrimination enforced
by local security commanders in favour of the Sinhalese. In January 1997
Brigadier P.S.B. Kulatunge prevented Mayor Sooriyamoorthy from opening the new
market he had built, as the city father, obscurely citing “the deterioriating situation in the area, and
the general interest of the public in Trincomalee” (Special Report No.8). Now it would
appear that another security top brass erected a Buddha statue thus creating a
‘deteriorating security situation’ to give the Tigers the cover to kill the
former city father. The Buddha statue that signalled his death promises to
remain the monument to the city father’s memory, rather than the new market he
built and was not allowed to open.
The Karuna split brought about a situation where the
Security Forces were called upon to provide security for the LTTE as well,
especially in the East. The result is a picture that would seem utterly bizarre
to the Tamil youth who joined the militant groups by the thousands after July
1983. All shades of Tamils, traitors and heroes, must now routinely seek protection
from the Government security forces chiefly against fellow Tamils, whether or
not it will come. There has even been an instance where LTTE child abductors
attacked by the inmates of a tsunami refugee camp were rescued and hospitalised
by the STF. LTTE dignitaries travelling by land or air must depend on
government forces for their security.
Nevertheless the LTTE is not inhibited from attacking
security personnel protecting Tamil parties opposed to them and those
associated with intelligence gathering. In recent weeks LTTE attacks on
security forces in the East have become a daily occurrence. The resulting
situation is one of menacing subterranean currents where appearances are
deceptive. Several LTTE offices in the East have also been attacked and persons
said to be LTTE intelligence cadres have also been killed.
During April the number of recorded killings by the Karuna
faction (outside combat) was one. In May this number rose to 4 and to 5 in
June, and in July the startling attack on the LTTE office in Chelvanayakapuram,
Trincomalee killing four including an important Sea Tiger leader, was
attributed to the Karuna faction by the Colombo media and not denied by Karuna.
The number of security personnel killed by the LTTE has also shown a
corresponding increase: April-1 (abducted), May-2, June-5. July-3 up to the 20th.
Important triggers in the escalation have been the LTTE’s abduction of Inspector
Jeyaratnam on 20th April, the killing of Colonel
Mutaliph of Military Intelligence on 31st May and the killing of 3
Military Intelligence personnel in Batticaloa on 30th June. That the
State’s intelligence services were taking a direct hand was suggested in the
killing of TamilNet editor Sivaram on 28th April and a blip
in early June of three killings of Tamils in Colombo soon after Muthaliph’s
murder. Our sources in Jaffna affirm that two of the youths killed are innocent
of LTTE involvement.
Killings by the LTTE have also spiralled. In April the LTTE
murdered about a dozen of persons, mostly political opponents and civilians who
did not toe the line. The peacemakers, donors and the Government appeared
accept this as a normal part of the Sri Lankan peace process. Subsequent months
saw an escalation with the LTTE becoming increasingly reckless. LTTE killings listed
in the Appendix give approximately: May-13, June-21, and July-13 (up to the 20th).
Explaining these trends is a thankless task as there are so
many forces at play that we do not know about. The Press, analysts, and the
peace lobby have taken the easy way out and refer to the Karuna faction or this
faction and all opposition groups collectively as paramilitaries. Unfortunately
the discussion has been dictated by the unqualified occurrence of the term
paramilitary in the ceasefire agreement, the LTTE’s free use of it to describe
all its opponents and the ready acquiescence by most others. The LTTE media
have for example attributed a number of killings (mainly its own) after the
ceasefire to the EPDP. Not one of the attributions holds water under scrutiny.
At the same time the LTTE has been attacking and killing EPDP cadres regularly
in the hope that they would start killing, and thus give credence to their
allegations.
In the case of the Karuna faction, much caution is required
in making a distinction between receiving possible support from some sections
of the security forces and being paramilitaries with direct ties to state
forces, even though the faction is sadly today largely known for killings in
the manner of its parent. This is a trend that portends long-term disaster. At
the beginning Karuna articulated a political line exposing the LTTE leader, his
former boss, apologising for what he had done and making overtures to the
Muslims. That seems to be over now.
Going by reports, however, the Karuna group’s clout in Batticaloa-Amparai is credible. Many cadres appear to be hiding their weapons and leading semi-normal lives or are in hiding close to their villages. We have found no solid evidence that they are receiving significant support from the security forces or the Government. They receive little protection even in government-controlled areas. In these areas we have a number of cases of their cadres being killed by the LTTE when visiting their homes. When they are injured they are taken to a normal government hospital, rather than a military hospital, where the LTTE again targets them. Up to 40 of them are in police custody, arrested for being found with arms.
Nevertheless, any opposition to the LTTE without a political
commitment to human rights and democracy would be ultimately disastrous. The
Tamil people have no alternative but to challenge and check the ruinous order
imposed by the LTTE. But efforts to do so in active partnership with the
Sinhalese polity have repeatedly proved ineffective. This polity instead sought
to appease the LTTE while treating the mass of the Tamils with contempt. When
their short cuts proved unattainable they wanted the same Tamil opposition they
spurned and sacrificed to act as killers and targets. Even in the hour of
danger when wisdom and restraint are most needed, they cannot resist the
temptation to plant Buddha statues in sensitive areas Cyril Mathew-style to
assert Sinhalese-Buddhist supremacy. Partnership entails a working sense of
honour and an ability to see at least beyond the tip of their nose. Fifty years
is far too long a time to learn.
The facts will have to be faced if any peace process is to move ahead.
Rasathurai Thangarajah (60) of Kommathurai, Udupiddy,
Jaffna, was shot and killed by the LTTE on 4th June. He was detained
and tortured by the LTTE in 1986 on account of his nephew in the TELO, which
the LTTE decimated that year. He later fled to India, returned in 1990, was
detained by the LTTE again and released. He lived as a poor farmer on a small
plot of land. The LTTE later sold Thangarajah’s land using a forged deed to a
rich local man Thurairasa, who had lately established himself as an LTTE
supporter and had his daughter married to Thileepan Thevarasa of the LTTE
intelligence wing, who is also a cousin of Sea Tiger Leader Soosai’s wife.
Thangarajah refused to quit the land despite being tied to a tree and whipped
by Thurairasa. Failing to obtain help from the Police and his TNA MP,
Thangarajah filed a plaint in court for both assault and for the restoration of
his land. He was thus murdered and the matter under ceasefire law ends there.
Sinnathamby Annapillai, an elderly lady of 65 years, died in
a grenade explosion after sunset on 21st May, in the LTTE’s Periya
Kallar office, south of Batticaloa. The LTTE media were unanimous in informing
us that ‘there were no LTTE officials in the office at
the time of the attack’. While helpfully
pointing out that the office is 500 metres from the STF camp, TamilNet
also added that the deceased was the owner of the house. We understand through
close relatives of the deceased that the elderly lady had repeatedly gone to
the house demanding that the LTTE give it back to her. The grenade blast was
the LTTE’s reply.
The following case illustrates how far the State has gone in confidence building with the LTTE. We reported in Bulletin No.33 that Thilliampalam Tharmapalan, retired store keeper in the Sugar Corporation who was living as a caretaker in the Sugar Corporation quarters next to the store, near Arasady Junction in Batticaloa, was strangled by the LTTE in December 2002 in a manner made to appear like suicide in order to acquire the premises. A Daily Mirror item on 15th May 2005 reported:
“The
CID cracked open the mystery killing, which had been written off as a case of
suicide... On December 19 in 2002, the deceased was found hanging from a beam
in his house. It was only one week before that he had made two complaints to
the police at Kohuwela and Batticaloa alleging that his life had been
threatened and that he feared for his safety. In his complaint, he had stated
that his life was being threatened by a high ranking officer of the Corporation
(Privatised Hingurana Sugar Industries Pvt. Ltd) and of Batticaloa Excise
Department who were attempting to acquire the premises where the deceased was
living...”
As to
who really was trying to acquire the premises, we reported: “The LTTE [in mid-2002] approached
Tharmapalan and asked him to leave. He refused. In mid-November 2002, the LTTE
brought some people and got them to clean the premises. Tharmapalan stayed on
even though the LTTE made its intentions clear.” We checked again recently
and learnt that the premises are now the (LTTE’s) TRO office awaiting donor
largesse.
T. Kailanathan (55) who had wide experience in technical
education was deputy director in the Ministry of Vocational Education. He went
to Batticaloa and as part of the effort in tsunami relief interviewed students
at the Government Technical College in Manjanthoduwa trained in carpentry,
irrigation and handiwork. An LTTE intruder shot him dead while he was having
his lunch. TamilNet hinted strongly about who killed him and why: “Mr. Douglas Devananda, MP, leader of EPDP and a close ally
of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, is the Minister for Vocational Education.”
Nitharsanam.com went overboard to describe Kailanathan as a victim of an
internal quarrel in the EPDP. Kailanathan was known to be a duty conscious
professional with no political involvements.
A.K. Thavarajah, Divisional Secretary
of Thirukkovil was shot dead in the evening of 15th April while
returning from his office. The LTTE media (e.g. TamilNet) and even the
English press pointed to a dispute concerning the switching of Prabhakaran’s
and Chandrika Kumaratunge’s pictures in the DS’s office to make diametrically
opposed cases. According to the LTTE media, the STF removed Prabhakaran’s
picture and hung the President’s picture behind the DS’s seat in February,
following which the LTTE regional sports secretary Kaviyalan made the reverse
switch in March while an STF man watched. Once more the STF restored status quo
ante. The LTTE media pointed out that the killing took place within a short
distance of the STF camp.
We verified through other reliable
sources that the murder had an all-together different provenance. Following the
ceasefire the LTTE virtually took over contracts given by DSs in Tamil
divisions and appropriated huge funds. The person in charge of finance for the
area was the LTTE’s Reagan. Reagan vanished after the Karuna split, by which
time he had received two cheques from the DS for the construction of a road at
Pavattakulam, Thandiyadi. Meanwhile some contractors had also complained to the
LTTE that Reagan had not paid them. Reagan returned to the country after one
attempt to go abroad and the LTTE located him in Colombo trying to go again and
summoned him to the Vanni. In going over accounts Reagan claimed that the DS
owed him a further sum of money.
The DS maintained that he had settled.
We understand that the LTTE detained him on two occasions and extorted money
from him. There were also other problems. The DS had maintained good relations
with the STF, the EPDP and the Government in addition to LTTE bigwigs such as
Thilak and Bawa. On one occasion the DS was asked to host a development meeting
in Thirukkovil to be attended by MPs from the District who included Sinhalese.
This he did against the LTTE’s orders. The DS had also rented tractors for
tsunami work from individuals when the LTTE wanted to be the sole supplier. On
the final day an LTTE man came to the DS’s office late in the evening and
wanted the DS to meet him nearby.
Thavarajah’s funeral in Pandiruppu was
attended by a huge crowd, including government officers. The Government was
silent. A new reality in the North-East where government officers are the
cornerstone of any rehabilitation effort is that they are terrified of being
given money and asked to spend and account for it. Another government officer
killed in the course of duty is Police Inspector Jude Thiyagarajah of
Alaiyadichchenai, Batticaloa. The Government had posted him home to Batticaloa
to assist in tsunami relief. The LTTE shot him dead at 6.30 PM in Batticaloa
town on 28th May 2005. He was interred in his native place.
In Special Report No.18 we gave the cases of the murder two tsunami affected persons Alagiah Kirubeswaran and Subramanaiam Dayanithy whose families in the Paddy Marketing Board refugee camp under TRO (LTTE) supervision. In a number of instances refugees have clashed with the LTTE over the abduction of refugee children.
Murugesu Varatharajah, a tsunami refugee in a camp in Kallady, Batticaloa, fisherman, father of three children and EPRLF-P local council member, was shot dead by the LTTE on 28th April. Rathirani, wife of the deceased, was arrested and released by the LTTE some time ago.
On 15th June, Nallathamby Raveendran (28), an
inmate of Wesley College refugee camp, Kalmunai, who was working at the
Kalmunai bus stand was shot dead by the LTTE along with his colleague and time
keeper Kulanthai Marikkar Kaleel (43). The latter we understand had ignored
over time the LTTE’s orders to send vehicles for their functions.
Alagiah Ravichandran (38) from the EPDP who went to visit
his family in the tsunami refugee camp at Karunkoditivu, Akkaraipattu, was hacked
to death by the LTTE about 9.00 PM on 20th June.
These cases illustrate the state of anarchy in which the
LTTE is operating especially in the East where the leadership has given its
cadres the licence to kill perceived enemies, and a number of them inevitably
use it for personal ends. Batticaloa after the Karuna split resembles an
undisciplined army coming into occupation of an alien territory. Many of those
being killed have no involvement in the fight between the Karuna and Vanni
factions of the LTTE.
One member of the family, Tharmaratnam
Illamaran (Ravi), was among the abler members of the EPRLF-P, based in
Chenkalady. The party was in difficult financial straits and Ravi and those
with him crossed over to the EPDP.
Ravi’s mother Omanathan Mohanalatchumi was murdered by the LTTE in March
1989. Mohanalatchmi’s younger sister
Komalathevi, Ravi’s ‘chinnamma’ (aunt), was killed by the LTTE in 1993
and her body left on the railway tracks. Komalathevi’s husband Puthirasigamani
was murdered by the LTTE in 1998. It is Komalathevi’s son Kugathasan who
was recently murdered ‘in the belief that he was close to the EPDP’.
Killers will find no rest from their labours.
The LTTE made another in a series of attempts on Ravi’s life
on 9th June as described earlier, killing a civilian (see also
Appendix). The LTTE also threw a grenade at the EPDP’s office in Valaichenai
under Siva (former EPRLF-P) on 5th May and attacked a vehicle
transporting EPDP members in the same area on 12th May and injured 4
policemen in their escort.
A number of those being targeted by the LTTE are persons
with no political involvement, but simply employed in party offices. On 8th
April, Thurairajasingam, a peon at the EPDP office in Batticaloa was badly
assaulted by Sathiyaraj, a notorious LTTE killer once arrested by the Police,
bailed out through the Appeal Court in return for policemen abducted by the
LTTE. He now roams about his killing fields free of impediment. On 18th
May Arumugam Murugupillai, another employee of the Batticaloa EPDP office was
murdered by the LTTE when he went to the market under police escort to buy provisions.
Such killings are a perennial
hazard in Sri Lanka where governments lack policy. They fail to take a stand or
give firm and viable directions to the security services and indulge in
manoeuvres which these services are not equipped to handle, and consequently
leave them feeling angry and at a loose end. Not only were governments blind to
LTTE killings of intelligence personnel, but when Colonel Muthaliph was killed
by the LTTE, the state owned Daily News said in its lead story on 3rd
June that ‘the Police probe into the assassination of Commanding Officer of
the Military Intelligence Corps Lt. Colonel Nizam Muthaliph took a new turn
yesterday with the latest evidence pointing to the possible hand of a secret
organization [operating with the backing of a certain chauvinist political
organization] behind the plot.’ The report quoted investigators as
speculating on the possibility that the killing ‘was linked to certain
crucial political decisions that are being anticipated in the coming days.’
This was a deplorable instance
of the fate of an intelligence officer being used in a game of political
football to do with numbers in Parliament, under donor pressure over P-TOMS
(the Joint Mechanism for Tsunami Relief to be signed with the LTTE) and the
JVP’s opposition to it. The other side of the coin is that in the same
frivolous vein, the same governments would turn a blind eye to the intelligence
services venting their anger on Tamil youths and the occasional journalist. The
fate of the civilian population in the North-East is an even larger game of
political football.
We saw an instance of
spontaneous civilian reaction to LTTE child abductors at a tsunami refugee camp
in Thirukkovil. In the North, the fisher folk in Gurunagar rose up against the
LTTE last year, and the fisherfolk in Pallimunai last February (Special Report
No.19). Such instances appear to have become more frequent. At mid-day on 16th
April, a motorcycle carrying three persons had an accident with a mini van from
Muhamalai taking a diversionary route to Jaffna through Kopay and Irupalai
owing to road maintenance. The LTTE’s Kopay commissar arrived there and ordered
the van burnt. The van drivers went on strike over the next three days. The
LTTE sent Balaiah, its commissar for private transport, to talk to the Thenmaratchy
van operators. The meeting became heated with the van operators almost
assaulting Balaiah and demanding compensation for the burnt van from the LTTE.
The mini bus owners also assaulted the elderly Uthayan reporter, after
the paper reported contrary to the police report that the van driver was at
fault over the accident.
History sometimes repeats itself
in strange ways. The old anger resides in the system and breaks out again. Two
years ago the LTTE murdered Maclan Atputharajah, President of the same mini bus
owners association in Thenmaratchy. After first agreeing the Uthayan
refused to publish an appreciation for the deceased written by the family. As
we reported in Bulletin No.32: “The statement issued and delivered to the Uthayan
by the Minibus Owners’ Association met with the same fate. The MOA took issue
with reporters on the day of the funeral for not informing the public of an
event that was undoubtedly newsworthy. The reporters, who felt bad, told the
MOA to parade their buses as a mark of protest and that they would photograph
it and publish it. The parade did take place, but the reporters did not turn
up!”
On 9th June a
speeding LTTE vehicle knocked down and killed Harichandran (42) in
Puthukkudiyiruppu Mullaitivu. The parents of the deceased who went to the LTTE
police to lodge a complaint were abused and driven away. Immediately afterwards
relatives and village folk converged on the police station, attacked it along
with LTTE shops in the neighbourhood and set fire to LTTE checkpoints. About 45
villagers, including the headman, were then arrested on the orders of the LTTE
IGP Nadesan. Thenee.com said in its report that faced with having to
pacify the villagers, LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan wanted the villagers
released, which Nadesan refused on the grounds that those who laid hands on the
Police should not be spared.
On 15th May the
LTTE’s Kodikamam (Jaffna District) commissar Rathinam lured Miss. Nalini
Selvarajah (16) of Karukkai, Varani to the Kodikamam office intending to send
her to the Vanni for training. Nalini’s parents and relatives kept vigil
outside the office demanding her release. The LTTE did not respond. On 19th
June, the civilians forced their way into the LTTE office, assaulted Rathinam
and rescued the girl.
Although we cannot say definitely who is responsible for a
killing in every particular instance, given some time and effort it is possible
to make the attribution. We could however say that all killings of persons
connected to opposition parties are by the Vanni faction and most killings of
former members of the LTTE and of civilians are also by the Vanni faction. Some
of the problems of identification are evident in the cases listed in the
Appendix where we have attempted to clarify most reported cases.
The indiscipline and violence the Vanni faction has shown in
its dealings with government servants and civilians underlies the enormity of
giving the Vanni faction complete control of tsunami relief in Tamil areas,
particularly in the East.
The cardinal error in the peace process was that in its
quest to simplify the negotiating field, it virtually delegitimised shades of
opinion in the North-East opposed to the LTTE.
Peace brokers tried to sweep the Karuna rebellion under the
carpet. They turned a blind eye to the
LTTE’s attacks on critics and opponents.
When persons targeted by the LTTE started responding violently -- as was
bound to happen – they had no way of dealing with the problem.
When would-be peacemakers tell opponents of the LTTE that
their lives cannot be guaranteed unless they ask Karuna to stop attacks, the
real message delivered is a raw military threat. This was the logic of
Solheim’s response to non-LTTE political leaders in Batticaloa who made a plea
to stop killings. In a subsequent meeting on the same subject with the SLMM’s
deputy head Haukland, he ambiguously pointed to the clause in the ceasefire
agreement, which required all paramilitaries to be disarmed and placed outside
the North-East. The suggestion was that
these unarmed political party representatives, who had gathered in Batticaloa
to ask for protection against the daily killings, were actually armed
paramilitary forces and had no right to be in Batticaloa in the first place.
In essence, political opponents of the LTTE have almost
literally been told that they could choose between becoming martyrs or
guerrillas. Even Norwegian deputy minister Helgeson who called on the LTTE
leadership for the signing of P-TOMS came back with nothing to say on the subject
of killings. Rather than a recipe for
peace, this logic is a spur to rising anarchy.
We have said repeatedly that there cannot be political progress without an end to impunity. Neither peace nor reconstruction in the North-East can succeed unless the LTTE abandons its ideological pre-conditions and makes peace with fellow Tamils and the rest in the North-East. These are the issues that need to be addressed.
We now hear the regular beat of war drums. Having forced the
country down the road of P-TOMS the donors appear to have been startled into
second thoughts. Having given the LTTE a free run of the country under the
ceasefire agreement, the Government panicked into conniving at killing persons
who would normally have been arrested during war. The multiplicity of ironies
is so bewildering that if a war is to be avoided only the donors could prevail
on the two parties by being firm. Any move forward must also involve a human
rights agreement. The lack of one is now clearly seen to be the core problem.
Home | History
| Briefings | Statements
| Bulletins | Reports
| Special Reports | Publications
| Links
Copyright © UTHR 2001