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University Teachers for
Human Rights (Jaffna)
Sri Lanka
UTHR(J)*
Information Bulletin No. 37
Date of Release: 10th January 2005
2.
A Sea of Change: The Untold Story of the Tidal Wave
3. 26th November – 25th
December: War Fever
4.
Nature Strikes: The LTTE’s response
5.
Delivery is subject to weather conditions and availability of transport.
6.
Hints of the Mullaitivu Scene
7.
Traces of Sanity in Killinochi
8.
LTTE abroad: The TRO-Pottu Amman Nexus
9.
Behind the Apparent Somersault: Burning of the Refugee Camp
11. Wrecking of Trincomalee: Incompatibility
of Sole Representation with Peace
12.
Strengthening the Humanitarian Space and Ending Conflict
Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have an
unquestionable moral responsibility to ensure that disaster victims receive prompt
and appropriate assistance and should dedicate resources and infrastructure to
help them. This requires setting aside political differences, overcoming
decades of neglect and bureaucratic dysfunction and allowing every available
and potential source of support and assistance to contribute to the effort of
rebuilding our communities. As
important as anything else is the need to give hope to the people, rather than
contribute to their trauma and despair.
Giving hope means a readiness to work with each other and
being generous in acknowledging the good done by others. Testimonies given to
us by witnesses in Batticaloa-Amparai, Trincomalee and Vadamaratchy tell the
same story: personnel from the country’s armed forces – the STF, Army and Navy
– in the wake of the Tsunami, left their weapons and threw themselves into the
dangerous waters to rescue civilians, in some instances losing their lives. In
the aftermath, neighbouring Sinhalese and Muslim communities and the armed
forces stretched themselves in caring for those affected, and are still doing
so.
Much of these highly remarkable developments have gone
unreported or pushed to the sidelines of the news concerning the North-East. A
part of the answer is the incompetence of the state media, indifference of the
Colombo media and LTTE propaganda networks having established a firm foothold,
at least to confuse the international media. The LTTE, and the Tamil media
controlled by it, largely ignored this non-partisan outpouring of humanity and
from day-one started attacking the armed forces and, contrary to authentic
reports from the ground, accused them of harassment, blocking rations, stopping
a Russian medical team and burning a refugee camp among other violations. It
accused the Government of discrimination in the distribution of relief and
waxed loud that no one was helping the Tamils. By the time the foreign media
came in large numbers, they lost sight of the one-sidedness of these claims and
provocations, and started talking about deep hatreds and the ethnic conflict.
This in short was how the LTTE positioned itself to make political capital of a humanitarian crisis lacking political content and to position its agency, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, to act as the sole body dispensing relief in areas it controls and throughout the North-East. The troubling political implications need not be spelt out. We are concerned that the international community may forfeit this opportunity for permanent peace, a political settlement and reconciliation, by allowing their misjudgments (which have amply been in evidence these last three years), the LTTE’s ploys, and the Southern polity’s incompetence and opportunism, dictate the agenda.
International donors and all concerned individuals seeking
effective ways to assist survivors of this disaster should demand
accountability and transparency from the TRO and all other partner agencies as
a condition of cooperation. This should only be for purposes of urgent relief,
avoiding measures that confer legitimacy on the LTTE’s terror machine by the
back door. They should at the same time encourage and support the development
of social coping mechanisms that do not rely on the LTTE, including especially
independent civil society organisations and initiatives, and should continue to
press the LTTE to stop threatening others who are trying to do humanitarian
work. The TRO’s present demand that all major relief and reconstruction work
should be entrusted to it and it alone is totally unacceptable, and has upset
many donors who came to help and to work, leaving them with little alternative
but to go back. We shall expand on these concerns in the sequel.
For Sri
Lanka this unprecedented natural disaster comes in the train of decades of
man-made disasters – communal strife and war. Among most Sri Lankans, this
natural disaster has thrown up a spontaneous urge to reach out across man-made
differences and help the needy and stricken. Even as the Government’s response
and capability was felt to be grossly inadequate, whether in the North-East or
the South, the spontaneous help from men, women and children from all walks of life
made all the difference.
These are
the bright spots. War is at least temporarily in abeyance. But the fault lines
that were prominent before the disaster still persist. Unless we come to terms
with them, the present potential for peace and unity will be lost. The
alternative Tamil web site Thenee.com
reflected editorially:
“Tsunami (the tidal wave) is an angel that
came to teach lessons to all communities…It reduced us to a level where even
the dead are indistinguishable as Tamil, Muslim, or Sinhalese. Nature taught us
that in death we are all one. Even as international agencies are struggling to
protect the victims [gunmen] shot dead a youth [from a rival faction] who went
to Porativu [in Batticaloa] to look for his disaster-stricken family. Those trained
in murder as their profession are incapable of any goodness or humanity…It
takes no genius to breed hatred against our brothers. No ability or talent is
required to exalt one’s pride and ego, humiliate others and earn thir hatred.
Tsunami has taught us that learning to earn the love of others is the most
precious lesson.”
For the
LTTE the natural disaster, which crippled its war machine, has been a bitter
lesson that terror is a fickle asset. Before the disaster it manipulated the
international community into a programme of appeasement by threatening the
discontinuation of the ceasefire. In the days following the disaster, the LTTE
proclaimed a ‘national emergency’, implicitly thrusting itself as a state, and
demanding international aid on its own terms.
The Tigers
have done the Tamil cause the worst possible service in destroying its moral
and democratic content and identifying it with terror. Today the victims under
LTTE control along much of the seaboard from Vaharai to Pachchilapalai in the
north need all the aid they can get to rebuild their lives.
Many Tamils
all over the world and in the North-East wanted to share the agony of the
tragedy not only with their own community but also with the larger community in
Sri Lanka and others in the region. Those who are socially and politically
conscious would like to be part of the humanitarian effort. But they feel
powerless not only due to the scale of tragedy, but also because of the
manipulation and control the LTTE continues to exert over any independent
initiative. It is an extraordinary imposition on people in dire need. The LTTE
at various levels attempts to shield survivors from human contact with
outsiders for fear that it might pose a challenge to their narrow ideology. An example totally out of character with the
victims’ need, and the solemnity of the tragedy that bypasses human boundaries,
is the LTTE warning by loudspeaker the people of Valvettithurai to disengage
from the warm discussion they were having with Prime Minister Rajapakse on relief.
Further,
the social havoc the LTTE wreaked by imposing itself as the ‘sole
representative’ in every sphere of life extends to relief and rehabilitation
work. The LTTE has insisted that its
agency, the TRO, is the only force on the ground fit to receive aid and
rehabilitate the victims. It may be
true that the TRO has substantially more resources at its disposal than most
local initiatives, but the TRO has a very poor record of accountability. The
large sums of money it collected for ‘refugees and relief’ prior to 2002 were
almost certainly laundered for military purposes as indicated by the
deprivations it imposed on people on the ground, even short-changing them on
government relief (see our reports for that period). We give below indications
of its strong links to LTTE intelligence.
Still, the
reality is that owing to the authoritarian control the LTTE exerts on the Tamil
community, and its overt (very obvious to locals) control of even the
government machinery in the North-East to service its ends, any humanitarian
work inevitably must deal with the LTTE. Those who want to support their
community independently of the TRO face various forms of pressure from slander
campaigns to direct threats unleashed by the LTTE propaganda machinery, locally
and internationally.
Many who
have watched the long drawn-out conflict in Sri Lanka have expressed hope that
the present tragedy will force an end to the political stalemate and bring
peace. Indeed there is real potential for all three communities and the leaders
to learn lessons from the disaster that could improve the prospects for a
peaceful settlement.
The
clearest evidence of this is the line the LTTE is promoting in the vernacular
press. Before the disaster the LTTE’s
propaganda machine was hard at work building up war hysteria. In its wake LTTE’s statements have played on
the desperation of survivors to encourage communal hatred and ensure the LTTE’s
control over relief. Unless the LTTE changes its attitude, the victims of the
recent tragedy who are among those in greatest need would suffer undue neglect.
In the
current context, where effective relief and rehabilitation is so urgently
necessary, the LTTE’s attitudes present a substantial challenge to the
international community and to local actors intent on reconstruction and peace.
Though hidden by the regime of terror, the Tamil public, both locally and
abroad, was groping for an alternative, even as the ordinary Sinhalese were far
in advance of peacemakers, who largely were stuck in the mud of an outmoded
ethnic conflict. The tidal wave precipitated changes in attitude that were
already at work deep within people.
When
disaster struck on 26th December, the Army had its camps along the
Vadamaratchy coast, and itself suffered much loss. Yet many people testified to
the courage and unselfishness shown by the Army in helping and rescuing people.
A fisherman from Katkovalam east of Pt. Pedro who was himself rescued by the
Army, testified that the Army helped all those it could and was uniformly kind
to everyone. As with many soldiers, this man had been hurt when thrown against
barbed wire fencing along the coast by the force of the wave.
Along the
seaboard of Trincomalee town and north of it, the Navy was the only body at
hand to help the civilians (mainly Tamil and Muslim). Around 8th
Mile Post (Kuchchaveli Road), in the wake of the turbulence the Navy asked the
civilians to run inland to Agampodai Hill, and later in the afternoon brought
food and water for them.
Kamaraj, a
toddy tapper who shinnied up a coconut tree in Gopalapuram had a clear view of
the mischief wrought by the tidal wave. He saw a navy man braving the flood and
going in to clutch at two children. Then he saw another wave, which swept all
three away. In Veloor, the corpse of a naval man clutching that of a child whom
he tried to save was recovered, with his shoelace caught in a fence. These are
actions, which, surely, cast a new ray of hope after decades of communal strife
and should be the cornerstone of a new beginning.
Similar
reports came from coastal areas close to Batticaloa Town, Kallady, Amirthakali
and Navalady. Testimonies were of the Army going into the water, pulling out
people and getting them to safety. Strangely, what the media largely ignored
was not lost on Batticaloa people abroad. A Batticaloa man said that he
received telephone calls from several of his friends in Australia and New
Zealand, asking him to convey their gratitude to the Army Brigadier in
Batticaloa for the good work done by his men.
In the
Kalmunai and Thirukkovil areas of the Amparai District, people
experienced 3 waves, and when the sea was seen to be wild, warnings were
shouted and people ran. A number of old people succumbed. The STF in these
areas has been commended for leaving their arms behind, going out into the
water, pulling people out and getting them to safety. They worked hard also at providing
transport and basic relief, and the people are very grateful for it. Food came
from neighbouring Muslims and Sinhalese.
Even more remarkable was the LTTE’s behaviour. In all these
areas where the LTTE had been unremarkable in the immediate aftermath of the
disaster, started asserting itself subsequently, trying to take over the
refugee camps and demanding that all relief material and work should be
controlled by them. It launched a virulent campaign against the armed forces
attacking them with blatant falsehoods.
The LTTE accused the Army through its media monopoly of
burning a refugee camp in Kudathanai, Vadamaratchy, supplying bad rice to
refugees and of obstructing relief. The Army cleared the road from
Valvettithurai to Pt Pedro and made it usable to traffic. The LTTE claimed
through its media that the Sea Tigers and the people had cleared the road.
Where the needs of the people who had suffered a grave
tragedy were concerned, the LTTE’s compulsions worked to the detriment of the
people. At the refugee camp in Varani in the North, the LTTE turned down clean
drinking water supplied by the Army. Everywhere people, especially foreigners,
bringing relief were turned away, unless they were prepared to give everything
to the LTTE.
Among the organisations that did relief work in Batticaloa
in the immediate aftermath were EHED, World Vision, Oxfam, ZOA and UNICEF. On 7th
January 2005, a rehabilitation meeting was held in Batticaloa, with the GA as
chairman and various NGOs, foreign relief representatives anxious to help,
religious leaders and the university vice chancellor in attendance. The meeting
started with a discussion of division of labour – one organisation to supply
tents, one in charge of sanitation and so on. The TRO suddenly ruled that in
Manmunai Division (Batticaloa Town and environs), it alone would be in charge
of relief work and the others should keep out. Similarly for Kiran and Vaharai.
Though deeply upset no one dared to protest. One organisation, which brought
relief for refugees in Batticaloa Central College, had to take it back when the
LTTE-TRO demanded that everything be handed over to them. The donors instead
distributed the materials to the needy in villages in the area. The victims
were being victimised again.
Why was the LTTE behaving so? Again roughly the same answer
came from residents all the way from Vadamaratchy to Komary and Pottuvil: The
LTTE is afraid that the people had rejected the LTTE and turned to the Army
(Navy, STF). It wanted to assert its power through taking over the refugee
camps and establishing lines of patronage. The LTTE had been thrown off
balance. It all started with the LTTE’s visions of grandeur in creating intense
war hysteria, until the very last day when the tidal wave struck.
On 19th
November 2004, the LTTE killed two youths in Valvettithurai and engineered
disturbances after blaming the killings on the Army. On 26th
November, the Leader’s birthday, the LTTE attacked with swords two soldiers who
had gone out of the Nunavil army camp and announced through its media that they
had been attacked by ‘persons who followed them’. Continuing this vein of provocation,
the LTTE’s Tamil language website Nitharsanam,
a journal thought to have been established by the LTTE’s intelligence wing
and aimed largely at an expatriate audience,
reported on 19th December that ‘Military Intelligence’ persons were
moving in the nearby Mirusuvil area in the night with swords and knives,
scaring the civilians who were reminded of an army atrocity five years earlier.
The LTTE peace secretariat was quoted saying that people intended to inform the
SLMM. The matter was not heard of again.
There was
also, according to reports from activists, heavy Sea Tiger activity along the
Mullaitivu coast with secret preparations in fenced off zones. It is also notable that for some months
increasing restrictions on fisher folk were being imposed by Sea Tigers. This
was the root cause of the clash between the LTTE and Gurunagar fisher folk in
Jaffna last August. A week before Christmas (18th Dec.) 12 fishermen
were assaulted off Pallai by the Sea Tigers, of whom 3 were hospitalised in
Jaffna (Tamilnewsweb).
The LTTE
also launched an ambitious recruitment drive in several areas. To give this
momentum, the LTTE coerced leading members of civil society to form committees
to organise human chains and protests against the Government’s alleged war
preparations and violations. A committee of five in Thenmaratchy included
Chandrasekaran (retired principal), Arunthavapalan (vice principal of Drieberg
College) and Balachandran (chairman, Chavakacheri, MPCS). A long list of Tiger
killings, including that of prominent civil society activist Maclan Atputharaja
in Chavakacheri, would amply explain why people could not refuse the LTTE.
Undercover
of ‘legitimate political work’ permitted under the cease-fire, the LTTE had
several times during the last three years forced school children onto the
streets in provocative demonstrations against the Army. This time LTTE
recruiters descended en masse to
accost children in schools and streets. Their message to the children was: “You are marked. When war begins soon, the
Army will kill you. You are safe only in LTTE camps”.
Police
sources in Trincomalee quoted in the press reported that in 3 weeks since Great
Heroes Day, the LTTE had taken away 400 children in the district for training in
Sampur. Reports from other districts also ran into hundreds. People were being
advised to sell all except their most precious items.
What made
the significant difference this time was that the LTTE through force, murder,
Norway’s appeasement diplomacy and the Government’s short-sightedness, had
acquired a complete monopoly of the propaganda space in the North-East. Through
provocations against the Army, leaflets, demonstrations and replaying the
disappearances caused by the Army in 1996, the LTTE frightened people into
believing that war was imminent. There had been a gradual movement of people,
especially relatives and caste sub-groups from which the LTTE had recruited
significantly, into the Vanni.
The LTTE
was also greatly irritated by the joint Indo-Lanka naval exercise and several
of its ‘analysts’ dutifully attacked the exercise as an obstacle to peace. We
list below in chronological order, some of the tokens of war fever featured in
the Tamil media in late December.
24th
December: Latest leaflet from the ‘Patriot’s
Organisation’ (Tamilnewsweb): “Come to harvest the land. The enemy has
given us the opportunity. We can again capture the land. We also need a second
force to protect the lands captured. Young men and maidens, come. Join us.”
An Uthayan editorial called the Government
of Sri Lanka’s agenda for talks with the LTTE a smokescreen: “The Tigers who have obtained a mandate as
sole representatives of the Tamil people, will not agree to any agenda for
peace talks contrary to that mandate.” (Though
Uthayan is supposedly an independent
daily from Jaffna, note the similarity in tone and content to contemporary
items from the LTTE media cited below.)
By this
time the Cease-Fire Agreement under Norway’s supervision was looking extremely
bizarre. While the LTTE’s actions, provocations, so-called political activity
and intimidation were in blatant disregard of the CFA; it kept reiterating to
the international community its commitment to a negotiated settlement. Norway
and the SLMM had clearly marginalised themselves. As though leading to a
climax, the following two ominous items appeared in succession in the LTTE’s
web site Nitharsanam on 25th
December, both suggesting that a major event was pending:
“The November (Karthikai) blossom is a
month old. Chandrika must take appropriate steps within one year. The National
Leader’s words (his Great Heroes Day Speech annually after nightfall on his
birthday, 26th November) are as rare as the November blossom. They
are not words wandering away in the air or dissolving in the sea, but are seeds
planted firmly on a hill. The Great Heroes Day speech is a unique experience in
the region. It is awaited and listened to eagerly by devotees and enemies
alike…It is the starting point of a gigantic deed”. [Quoted from Eelanantham daily of 24th
Dec.]
25th
December (Nitharsanam): “There has
been no response to the National Leader’s message delivered a month ago, based
on the people’s desires. The Southern political leadership has not responded to
the National leader’s words “We
cannot be imprisoned in a political vacuum any more”. We may thus
conclude that there looms the prospect of a massive change in the political
sphere.”
Aid goes hand in hand with journalistic
coverage. Anyone who has been to the Vanni knows that to leave the Kandy (A9)
trunk road and visit an interior village involves annoying checks and
bureaucratic procedures. Despite the CFA, the Vanni remained a closed
militarised region.
Instead of
flexibility in the interest of the victims the LTTE and its media published
story after inflammatory story aimed at stirring up Tamil resentment against
other communities and the Government.
They claimed initially that the Tamils and in particular the Vanni
victims were being ignored by the Government, the international community and the
media, while only the TRO and the LTTE were helping the victims. The English
language TamilNet, which is read by
many non-Sri Lankans interested in events in the North and East was a bit
subtler, while Nitharsanam, catering
to a Tamil-reading audience of ideologically pure expatriates drifted further
into fantasy.
On the day
of the disaster itself Nitharsanam had
already attacked UNICEF and UNHCR for not coming to the aid of victims in the
North-East, and accused the Government of understating losses in this
region. Later articles alleged that the
southern media was being pressured not to report the extent of damage in the
North-East; charged that an excess of aid was going to Galle and Matara, and
claimed that Sinhalese gangs with the connivance of the police were forcibly
redirecting vehicles carrying supplies to the North-East to the South. Playing to communal sympathies the website
also stated that many Tamil corpses could not be recovered, while thousands of
Sinhalese and Muslim corpses were being transported and buried in the
jungle.
On 28th
December, Nitharsanam went on the
offensive against efforts by dissenting Tamils in the diaspora to identify
alternatives to the TRO, publishing a letter purportedly from a Denmark
resident Tamil accusing some local fat
cat Tamils of blocking Danish government aid to the TRO. Pointing to the
Sri Lankan Army supposedly blocking relief supplies to Tamils in the East,
added, “Even if the world is destroyed
Sinhalese racism will never be destroyed.”
It should
be noted that Nitharsanam’s principal
use to the LTTE is in setting the party line for other Tamil media. Its stories, often light on facts and heavy
on rhetoric, come out quickly, and signal the editorial line to be followed by
other media who share its brand of nationalism or simply wish to stay in the
LTTE’s good graces. Its stories employ
a heavy chauvinist rhetoric that is common to many Diaspora Tamil journals and
frequently twist the truth in reports of important incidents, attempting to sow
doubt and division among critics.
Unlike Tamilnet, Nitharsanam regularly targets
dissenters, particularly in the expatriate community.
Tamilnet’s line, though similar is delivered in English
and generally steers clear of heavy-handed chauvinism and personal
attacks. It dutifully reported the
LTTE’s messages as they were delivered through its spokesmen and
surrogates. On 27th December TNA (LTTE) MP
Joseph Pararajasingham said that at a 2 hour long meeting called by Prime
Minister Rajapakse to discuss disaster relief, the North-East was discussed for
only 5 minutes, and that too after he raised the matter. Therefore he said that
they (TNA) have decided to ask the international community to send all aid
directly to the North-East (i.e. TRO).
By 30th
December Nitharsanam was implying
that it was the Sri Lankan security forces and not the LTTE that had prevented
foreign journalists from going to the Vanni and had redirected a 16-member team
of Russian medical experts who tried to enter the Vanni to Trincomalee, citing
security reasons. Were there any truth in these allegations, they would have
become a major issue and the Government would have been taken to task. TamilNet generally kept away from these.
Other sources and the Army said that it was the LTTE that turned back the
Russian team.
We have
observed for some time that the BBC (Tamil Service) has, while parading its
objectivity (a reputation it has justly held for most of its 60years in
existence) sometimes contributed to the LTTE’s propaganda efforts. S. Nagarajah
writing in Asian Tribune reviewed the
coverage of Vaharai on 29th December by two Batticaloa-based
correspondents Shanthi Selvadurai for the BBC Sinhalese Service and Uthayakumar
for the Tamil Service.
Selvadurai
reported the LTTE Vaharai leader Arivu’s allegation that the Government was not
providing immediate relief to the area and also the Government Agent’s reply
that he had been unable to send relief because of disrupted communications and
transport. Uthayakumar reported only Arivu’s allegations.
Selvadurai
also highlighted Sinhalese residents and Buddhist monks from the neighbouring
Polonnaruwa District going to the LTTE-controlled Vaharai area with lorry loads
of food and urgent relief. (These Sinhalese had periodically been victims of
LTTE attacks.) Uthayakumar only reported seeing some private citizens taking
relief supplies. On the same day Weerasinghe reported for the Sinhalese Service
that the monks and Sinhalese villagers were received warmly by the LTTE
commander and cadres. Weerasinge quoted the local LTTE political chief Jaya
describing the action of the Buddhist monks and Sinhalese villagers as the
triumph of humanity over pretty religious and racial squabbles. The Tamil
Service blacked out this most newsworthy aspect of the proceedings.
The
Government machinery is very bureaucratic, and is often slow to respond to
major disasters. Further it is an undeniable fact that long years of Sinhalese
chauvinist politics crippled the ability of minorities to advocate assistance
on their own behalf. Still, in this
case the Government insisted that it had routinely, as always, released money
to the local Government Agents to purchase and transport the assessed needs
from the nearest depots.
The Army in
a statement of 30th December contradicted the LTTE’s claims of no
help from the Government, saying that during the last two days a total of 370
lorries laden with relief entered the LTTE-controlled Vanni from the North and
South in accordance with requests made. The Army also confirmed that contrary
to LTTE claims, the Russian medical specialists had been refused entry by the
LTTE, and gave instances in Vavuniya and Trincomalee where it had to intervene
when the LTTE tried to remove relief from private donors.
By 30th
December, teams comprising the President or Prime Minister with other leading
members of Government visited all affected areas in the North-East. The people,
despite attempts by LTTE agitators to discredit the visit, undoubtedly welcomed
the Prime Minister’s team visiting Jaffna. At several places LTTE organised
picketers sometimes posing as university students, ostensibly to protest the
presence of the JVP’s Wimal Weerawansa in the delegation. In Jaffna and much of the North-East the
people were desperate and appreciative of the Army’s, STF’s and Navy’s work in
bringing relief to the victims, and there were even initial reports of LTTE
cadres working alongside the Army in Jaffna.
Here we see
that as in the past, the LTTE has permitted co-operation with state forces when
it was necessary to secure assistance, just as it accepted government rations
for its IDPs throughout the conflict, and help in facilitating travel and other
logistical needs during the ceasefire. At the same time, the LTTE continues to
very minutely monitor the people, ensuring that they do not look for
alternative representation or engineers so-called “peoples protests.” Its
organised hooligans kill opponents they label “traitors,” and feed the Tamil
press with the relentless theme of untrustworthiness of the Sinhalese
governments and its politicians.
But the
reality of the situation is such that even the TNA MPs and mainstream Tamil
press now and then need to come out with the truth. The Asian Tribune reported
Trincomalee’s TNA MP, Mr. Sampanthan being asked about the paucity of
government help. Sampanthan was quoted responding spontaneously, “Not only the Government, but even the
Sinhalese people are rushing to help us”.
The
Colombo-based Thinakkural (30. Dec)
another Tamil paper that generally promotes the LTTE agenda reported a moving
example of Sinhalese good neighbourliness. 50 lorries loaded with rice, sugar
and cooked food arrived from Uhana, Amparai, Kandy, Mahiyangana and Polannaruwa
with relief for the Tamil coastal villages north of Kalmunai. Owing to bridges
and roads being damaged between Periyanilawanai and Onthachimadam, Periya
kallar and Kottai Kallar among other areas were isolated. These Sinhalese
carried relief on their heads and shoulders and walked distances such as 5
miles to succour victims not reached so far.
The Daily News featured a photograph of two
women cadres in the East shaking hands
with the President.But Nitharsanam,
continued to play its game in a disgusting manner. An entry dated 30th
December described the party of ‘the
Sinhalese people’s political leader’ Mahinda Rajapakse as having come to reap
political capital in the Tamil people’s sorrow. It claimed that the delegation
including JVP’s Weerawamsa and EPDP members were chased and beaten by Tamil
women bearing ekel brooms, who also
threw human waste and rotten rice at them. Nitharshanam
also helpfully provided some pictures that showed some male ruffians holding ekel brooms.
The TULF
leader Mr. Ananthasangari, in a statement, reviewed reports of the ministerial
team that had visited Jaffna and testimonies of help the victims had received
from the Army and appealed to the LTTE: “This
is not the time to revive enmities!” However much the LTTE tried to
discredit the Sinhalese people and their leaders (often attempting to forcibly
take over relief brought by volunteers from the South), the ordinary people in
the North-East were responding warmly to humanitarian initiatives from the
South, and temporarily at least barriers were being broken. In areas relatively
isolated from centres of ideological control, such as Vaharai, LTTE cadres were
also responding. TNA MP Sampanthan in Trincomalee was moved, momentarily at
least, to be his former self and cast away the disguise tailored in
Killinochchi.
After the
foreign media and Southern civilians were allowed in, initial reports were
highly complimentary of the LTTE’s efficiency in cleaning up operations. What
was missing from these reports was even more significant – organised civil
society participation in these operations. The people as it were must look to
the LTTE to do everything for them. That was the image the LTTE was trying to
promote and sell, but what was the social cost of this regime?
The latter
was a fair suggestion, again hinting at greater access to journalists and
outsiders. The Government media has lacked the capacity to win over and give
confidence to Tamil listeners. This is the legacy of years of abuse and neglect
by government forces combined in recent years with LTTE terror that has
inhibited quality Tamil reporting in the state media. For example, Tamil
broadcasters in the state media rather than insist on their freedom to write
their own bulletins so that they would be relevant to listeners in the
North-East, play safe with everyone by reading out bland translations of
Sinhalese or English bulletins. Creative people find it difficult to work with
the government media, but alternative voices have little space in other Tamil
media. As everyone is now aware, LTTE terror reaches the South, no less than
the North and East.
The
following day (30th) LTTE political leader Tamilchelvan had
discussions with representatives of donors in Killinochi followed by a press conference
on a more conciliatory note. He denied that the LTTE had earlier turned back
vehicles bringing aid. While attempting to sound open as regards working with
the Government and the International community, the undertone was that the
Government and the international community are to work under the Liberation
Tigers.
Asked, “You said the Government and the
international community were not helping you, how is the situation now?,
Tamilchelvan replied: “The TRO and other
internal organisations were facing the problem. It was only after we publicised
the problem through the media [as requested by Karunaratnam?] that the
Government and the international organisations came rushing to commit
themselves”. Thamilchelvan added that some international organisations had
started work the previous say. [Nitharshanam].
Many who
rejected LTTE politics, but wanted to help, were left without any choice and
were pressured to associate with the TRO. We can find many well-meaning
individuals working with the TRO, but the fact remains that its primary
function has been as a front organisation, first to raise money and later to
liaise with international NGOs. For
years the TRO was tasked with monitoring, coordinating and controlling NGO
programmes at the behest of the LTTE.
This included blocking specific initiatives, prohibiting access to areas
or villages deemed off limits by the LTTE (for whatever reason), and limiting
co-ordinated efforts between different NGOs.
Many overseas volunteers came back disillusioned.
Its lack of
transparency and history of strong-arm tactics abroad was also catching up with
it. More and more Canadian Tamils were
asking questions about where the money raised by the TRO was going. In the
months leading up to 25th December, the TRO was facing a worrying decline
of contributions. An important event was the Human Rights Watch report on the
LTTE’s use of child soldiers and the meetings by the HRW in London and Toronto
where the issue was placed before Tamil expatriate audiences. Among other things an HRW representative
raised questions about expatriate donations to LTTE front organisations, and
warned of their potential misuse to support the LTTE’s recruitment of child
soldiers. This reference received prominent attention in the Canadian press. LTTE supporters in Canada reacted with anger
and HRW received veiled threats against Tamils who associated with the
organisation.
The
following day (23rd), the menace in the warning was stepped up in a
piece attributed to the News Division of Nitharsanam
titled ‘Warning to those collecting money
for corrupt purposes’, It said: “Funds
are being collected by individuals and groups, media organisations and Tamil
traitors among them, using the people’s sorrow as their pretext. They are being
watched closely. All that you collect by the way of funds or gifts should be
handed over to the needy through the TRO alone…[which must approve such
initiatives]. Only the IBC (International Broadcasting Corporation) from London
has approval to collect funds…” This item appears to have been removed
about 31st December.
Examine the
language: “traitors”…“They are being watched….” “The Leader will not
forgive….”, And to an unknown Canadian broadcaster: “His closest associates who went to the Vanni have told [LTTE
intelligence] all about him.” (Vayatkarai
Erambu, 22 Dec.): What kind of relief charity is this TRO whose patrons use
such intimidatory language, not against people who are stingy or heartless, but
against those who want to help, but through other agencies? Where in the world
does an agent of compassion, which appeals to the heart, threaten extreme
violence to get its funds?
In fact the
LTTE’s move to reverse, if not arrest, the movement of funds away from the TRO
was going on simultaneously in other parts of the world as well.
On the 24th
December, Nitharsanam attacked those
who contribute relief to organisations other than the TRO in a piece in Vayatkarai Erambu titled ‘The Cuckoo sings sweetly, cannot build a
nest or hatch’. It referred to the TRO’s appeal for urgent flood relief and
compared those who contribute to groups other than the TRO to thieves or
cuckoos, which lay eggs in other birds’ nests. The message in plain terms was
that a person who even once lays a contribution in any ‘nest’ other than the
TRO’s is a traitor, and once a traitor would always be regarded a traitor. The
same piece hinted at the earlier Human Rights Watch meeting in Toronto as
having left ‘bitter feelings’ among
people.
Nitharsanam of 23rd December targeted two
individuals Mathy Kumarathurai and Neel in Denmark. The article featured a
blown up picture of Neel and accused the two of being traitors working for the
Sri Lankan and Indian governments and of issuing leaflets in the name of the
LTTE calculated to embarrass them. One wonders why anyone else should do that
when Nitharsanam is doing the job so
effectively.
Nitharshanam’s
real problem with Mathy Kumarathurai appeared in another piece on 28th December after the tidal wave. It accused Kumarathurai of being in the central
committee of Karuna’s ‘anti-national gang’ and of telling Danish agencies to
divert funds to the South claiming that the North-East suffered little damage.
This and the next piece (letter from a Danish Tamil) made it clear that
Kumarathurai’s real crime was that he was against the Danish government aiding
the victims through the TRO.
What Nitharsanam
failed to say was that Kumarathurai, a well-known critic of the LTTE, is the
younger brother of A. Thangathurai, the TULF MP for Trincomalee who was
assassinated by the LTTE on 5th July 1997. Thangathurai had done
more for the war-affected Tamils in Trincomalee District than anyone had in
many years. These are people who owe their continuing misery to the Tigers.
Kumarathurai is from Mutur that was directly affected by the tidal wave and
many would object to aid to the victims being channelled through the TRO.
Once more Nitharshanam published a picture of
Kumarathurai. It has been the practice of Nithasanam
for sometime to publish pictures of individuals being targeted by the LTTE for
harassment or worse. Nitharsanam for
example published photographs of persons who attended the HRW meeting in
Toronto around the time that the organisation received phone calls
threatening to expose the identities of local Tamils who had contacts with
Human Rights Watch in a manner that would place them at risk. LTTE
operatives routinely go to meetings and photograph persons, especially those
who dissent and are outspoken, frequently with cameras attached to cell phones.
In publishing the photographs in Nitharsanam,
the message is, “Big Brother is watching you, Beware.”
Nitharsanam of 3rd January 2005 warned “Traitors in Canada collecting funds”. It
pinpointed the cultural group Thedakam
in Toronto, which did not function for sometime following constant LTTE
intimidation and the burning of its library in the early 1990s. Thedakam’s
organisers had begun to discuss
restarting its activities following the revival of Tamil dissent in recent
months. Nitharsanam warned, “In wiping away tears of your people, do not
let your money fall into the hands of traitors. Rather, our plea is that you
expose them. Contact the TRO and make your contribution. We remind you that the
responsibility of protecting the Administrative Structures of the Tamils rests
with everyone of you.”
On 28th
December, two days after the tidal wave, Nithatsanam’s
tone changed briefly. It thanked all Canadian Tamil and other media
collecting money to wipe away tears of relations (uravukal) in the motherland. It appeared that all fundraisers not
supportive of the TRO who had been
stridently attacked as traitors a few days ago, were now being thanked for
their good work We may take the change as the reflection of a hurried
reassessment going on throughout the LTTE machine. Even before the tidal wave the
LTTE’s attempts to intimidate and eliminate alternative fundraisers was only
making matters worse. After the tidal wave its position was even weaker. The
alternative station, the Canadian Tamil Broadcasting Corporation (CTBC) had
received a good response to its appeal, proving that many donors were
consciously on the lookout for more credible alternatives to the TRO.
It was
beginning to sink into the LTTE that the only political capital it relied on up
until then – that of threatening war – had been rendered meaningless by the
immediacy of the tsunami’s destruction. At all levels it began making more
accommodative noises – a common tragedy; no difference between Muslim,
Sinhalese and Tamil victims; all help is welcome, and so on. While thanking
fundraisers like CTBC who were earlier trashed as traitors, the LTTE also began
applying pressure on them to hand over their collections to the TRO. On the ground, after complaining for days
that no one was helping the Tamil victims, the TRO moved into refugee camps in
government-controlled areas, and virtually took over the camps, insisting that
all donations and relief should be through them alone.
The CTBC
director Kandiah Sivasothy, a former SLBC broadcaster, ran a programme on
Canada’s multi-cultural radio, which also admitted criticism of the LTTE. About
1995, some LTTE men from Valvettithurai visited his apartment, threatened him,
and to make their point pulled out a weapon and fired a shot without hurting
Sivasothy. Sivasothy was silent for sometime and about 2000 started the CTBC,
taking a line critical of the LTTE after the Karuna split. CTBC came under
concerted attack after it started collecting money for flood victims at home
even before the tidal wave, and by about 30th December had collected
about CD 280,000. The LTTE reportedly traced the contributors from the names
and addresses read out on CTBC, several of whom received calls from the ‘TRO’
asking them to telephone the CTBC and tell it to give the money to the TRO. The
CTBC reportedly gave CD100,000 to TRO.
On 31st December 2005, TamilNet gave a good hint of what this new accommodativeness was all about. It became clear that the old dirty politics was going strong. With the prospect of foreign aid coming in, Sea Tiger Commander Mangales was quoted highlighting the need for heavy machinery including bulldozers to clear the Vadamaratchy East coastal road for vehicular traffic. This was a strange priority when the BBC reported thousands of Mullaitivu residents so traumatised by losses of kin to be despairing of ever returning to their homes. For Vadamaratchy East residents, their economic links are mainly with the Jaffna peninsula and its markets. The Vadamaratchy East coastal road also links the Jaffna peninsula to the mainland. It is assessed by persons with local knowledge of being essentially a military road, suitable for combined land and sea movements, whose importance lay in the LTTE’s plans to overrun the Jaffna peninsula in the event of starting a war.
Another
item in TamilNet alleged some
displaced persons in Vadamaratchy, Jaffna, protesting against bad rice given as
relief, which it quoted an official (DS) saying was rice from a relief offering
by the Army. Local sources told us that the incident took place in front of the
DS’s office in Pt. Pedro, where some refugees piled up rice unfit for
consumption. Throughout the entire protest there was no talk that the rice was
given by the Army, until the allegation later appeared in the pro-LTTE media.
When people
lived under LTTE control rotten rice was not uncommon because the LTTE took the
new stocks and released what was going bad to the public. The LTTE when pulling
out of Jaffna in 1995 set fire to stocks of rice it had stored in Navatkulli
and Kachchai lest they be left for those who failed to follow them into the
Vanni.
Early in
the New Year, less than a week after the disaster, the LTTE showed strong signs
of having decided that it would use force, when necessary, against disaster
victims to ensure that the humanitarian space opened up would not bring the
Tamils closer to the Government and the Sinhalese. The three versions below of
the same incident, the first two respectively Tamil and English LTTE versions,
are instructive:
In Nitharsanam’s version of 2nd
January, the Sri Lankan Army chased away 64 families of refugees from a refugee
camp in Kudathanai, Vadamaratchy, and set fire to the camp. Two children it
said were hospitalised. TamilNet was
more ambivalent behind its sensational headline: ‘Army burns refugee camp’. It
reported that, 15 to 20 soldiers came
to the American Mission School refugee camp ‘allegedly to hand over food’ and
left when told that they were being helped by a Tamil organisation. 15 minutes
later 200 ‘attackers’ came to the camp and assaulted all males…The refugees are
now in the Catholic Church, Kudathanai. The next morning TNA (LTTE) MP
Sivajilingam charged the Army with burning the camp.
The report
that appears (based on our research) to be closest to the truth came from Tamilnewsweb [an alternative web portal
close to the EPRLF(V)], which reported that the Army had helped settle 70
families of 290 persons displaced by the disaster in the Kudathanai American
Mission School and was feeding them. The LTTE repeatedly warned the refugees
not to accept food from the Army, but with little effect. At 7.00 PM on New
Year’s day when the Army arrived with food, some agitators believed to be from
the LTTE’s Venpura (White Dove)
organisation were waiting for them, and rejected the food and created a scene.
After the Army left, agitators under the direction of the LTTE chased the
refugees to the Catholic Church, and burnt the American Mission school about
1.00 AM. Next morning the LTTE brought TNA MPs Sivajilingam, Suresh
Premachandran, and Sivanesan, with ‘press’ photographers, who gave the
finishing touches.
According
to local sources contacted by us, the Army had been feeding the refugees at the
American Mission School in Nadu-Kudathanai, until the LTTE-TRO-Venpura moved in and told the refugees
that they should not accept food from the Army, as it was not hygienically
prepared. But a significant number of the refugees ignored them and kept taking
the Army’s food. The rest of the story is as in the Tamilnewsweb report. The LTTE chased the people and burnt the camp
as a punishment to those who showed hints of wanting to be outside their
control. The LTTE media shouted aloud that the Army burnt the camp. But their
credibility is getting to be so low that even humble artisans confided in
private that the Army in recent times would never do such a thing. Privately,
people admit that the Army never interfered with the movement of refugees or
harassed them.
Among other
incidents in the same vein were reports that the LTTE hijacked three lorries of
relief supplies brought by Sinhalese civilians to Tamils in Batticaloa along
the Badulla-Chenkalady Road. One lorry reportedly escaped.
Anyone
wanting to help the refugees was directed to the nearest LTTE political
office. NGOs receiving aid from foreign
contacts and government officials had to go to the political office or risk
being noted by LTTE intelligence for punishment or harassment. They know enough
examples intimately to tell them what it could mean. Anyone making donations to
a camp must give it to the TRO poruppalar
(warden). Based on this degree of control over people who have lost nearly
everything, the LTTE is able to use these wretched folk as mobs of agitators.
It is a
measure of the abysmally low level of politics to which the LTTE has
reduced a once well-educated community,
that while the rest of the world is thinking about the plight of the victims
the LTTE spends energy organising vulgar demonstrations against the JVP and the
Prime Minister. The LTTE’s own media, amidst this enormous tragedy, boasts of
throwing ‘human (lavatory) waste’ at these gentlemen. The objective is to
tighten its totalitarian grip on the victims: no one else must have anything to
do with them except under our supervision.
The only
force the LTTE could not control directly was the Sri Lankan Army. Hence the
scenes like those at Kudathanai American Mission School. Another instance was
the camp in the Varani. The refugees lacked clean drinking water. The Army
brought drinking water in bowsers. The LTTE (TRO) made a scene and turned back
the water. The people who were left without clean drinking water were angry,
but were in no position to resist the tender mercies of the TRO.
As days go
by dissatisfaction with the TRO in the government-controlled areas is becoming
open at least to locals. Many of the affected see the TRO’s role as dictated by
fear that the people are grateful to the armed forces. The TRO’s definition of
affected persons as those who have lost their house or family member has left
day-labourers now without work complaining of being denied relief. They have
also complained of TRO’s partiality in distributing the best to favourites.
Refugees at Nelliady Central College complained that donations from NGOs,
individuals and the Government are coming in plentifully, but the refugees are
given only basic cereals (rice and dhal) and potatoes. They claim that large
stocks of biscuits and tinned fish are stocked up in a room. Quantities of new
clothes have been given, but the refugees received mostly used clothes while
the new are stocked up. Stories from the LTTE-controlled area would take a long
time to emerge.
Malpractice
is by no means new in Sri Lanka, but it normally involves connivance between
several interests, and seldom are they protected by pervasive terror. In the
case of the LTTE, the practice is so well organised that the pattern will be
the same everywhere. The question without an answer among the refugees is, who
will bell the cat?
We see
clearly here the absence of any dividing line between the LTTE and TRO, which
operates largely, if not entirely, as a social parasite, taking credit for
resources brought in by others, destroying the initiative and good will of
others, sapping the democratic will of the people, using them in the most
shameful manner, and in the end leaving them worse off. All those who are now
flocking to help the victims will get disgusted and leave, unable to lift the
condition of the victims above mere existence.
During the
first three days the LTTE made itself scarce and relief efforts went fairly
well. On the 26th it was the Navy that mainly provided food and
water to survivors. Kuchchaveli was isolated because of a broken bridge, and
there the LTTE reportedly provided the naval men with food and water. At this
point things were spontaneous. There was no agenda at work. On the 27th
the surviving youth with help form the Navy searched for bodies. Sinhalese came
from Kantalai bringing food and drink. The survivors in Kuchchaveli who were
cut off were fed and refreshed by Sinhalese from Gomarankadawela, who came by
an old interior route. The government relief machinery – the GA, DSs and local vidans
(head men) – was not functioning at this point. It was help from Sinhalese
neighbours that filled the gap.
It was on
the 28th that the LTTE recovered to get together an agenda
worldwide. Locally, the LTTE cadres appeared and things started changing for
the worse. TNA MP Sivajilingam put in an appearance by helicopter on the 28th
morning and Sampanthan in the evening. Government relief started moving, and the
LTTE asserted control. Wherever people were gathered in camps, LTTE-TRO sent
two cadres to each place as poruppalars.
The local youths who were involved in clearing operations largely withdrew once
the LTTE arrived. The LTTE started taking lists.
From the
time the LTTE arrived, rumours were spread, and actions instigated, to
undermine the spontaneous rapprochement. When the LTTE tried to take control of
relief distribution for the Muslims at 8th Mile Post, there was
friction. The Muslims refused to give a list of those affected to the LTTE,
even though they had given one to another Tamil party attempting to engage in
relief.
On the 28th,
a van with relief came from Trincomalee led by two men in white verti on a motorcycle, who were
evidently Tamil. They stopped at the 8th Mile Post mosque refugee
camp and asked some youths if there were Tamils there. When the youths replied
truthfully in the negative, the motorcyclists and van turned and went back.
Muhunthan, an LTTE cadre, and an ex-LTTE man Ramesh who were there accused the
Muslims of blocking relief for Tamils, and said the ‘soni’ (slang for Muslims) must be beaten. The Navy came in to
separate the two sides from the developing confrontation.
On the 29th,
reportedly at the request of LTTE political leader Elilan, Mr. Sampanthan
called a meeting of the GA (Government
Agent), the government administration and NGOs to discuss relief measures. The
GA did not attend. Shortly afterwards a rumour floated that the GA did not
attend because he had hidden 150 lorry loads of supplies in Fort Fredrick and
also that a shipload of Indian relief had been stashed away.
On 1st
January EPDP men were distributing relief at Gopalapuram when an
LTTE-instigated gang stoned them. The EPDP were forced to seek shelter in the
Navy Camp. The Navy, which had allowed free movement until then, installed
checkpoints. Things were by now becoming unpleasant.
The same
day (1st), the Sinhalese youths from Kelaniya University, with local
Tamils, were cleaning the local Tamil school, when the navy intruded and
checked their identities. The Sinhalese youths became frightened that things
were becoming dangerous and wanted to go back.
(The LTTE started every war by massacring Sinhalese.) The Tamils tried
to reassure them, but to no avail. The students went back. A navy man
reportedly told a Sinhalese student, “There
is so much to do in the South, why are you helping these people?” One
observer put it, that by 1st January, the two vethalams (evil genies) of Sinhalese and Tamil chauvinism had
climbed the murunga tree (got out of the bottle) once more.
The pattern
of the LTTE-TRO trying to assume sole-control and the deterioration of human
relations is the same in most places (e.g. Jaffna). The moment the LTTE steps
in, local initiative ceases and people who were active move aside into
isolation. The damage the LTTE has done by wanting to be sole representatives,
sole-fighters, sole-administrators and in general, sole heroes and sole doers,
is not readily evident to a casual observer.
They see only the LTTE-TRO at work, and there is truth when they say no
one is helping them.
The LTTE
machine will often organise relief efforts to some extent in an efficient and
orderly manner compared to the ponderous government bureaucracy. But behind
this there lies a political ideology and years of experience in manipulation of
local and international actors towards its vested interest, which gives little
regard to the people’s creative potential and their humanity. It can be
sustained only by destroying local civil society almost completely.
The
situation was markedly different in the South, where the Government’s efforts
were as ineffective. In Batapola near Galle for example, the Buddhist monk,
Ven. Nanda, mobilised civil society groups and was able to care for nearly 2000
affected persons.
Many
observers, who lived through the community’s trauma for the last two decades,
see a similarity with events that were set in motion when President Kumaratunge
became Prime Minister in 1994. LTTE insiders quite casually spoke about why
they wrecked the peace process and started war. They saw red when government
negotiators touched down in Jaffna University and crowds broke the LTTE cordon
to kiss the helicopter that brought them. Peace professionals wrote reams on
why the process foundered. An LTTE insider and editor of one of its media
publications simply told a friend: “The people are being dazzled by the web
of Chandrika’s peace, and the direction of our struggle is being subverted’.
He referred in particular to the ‘helicopter incident’. That explains what the
LTTE is doing after the tidal wave and why.
We have
argued that there is no change in the LTTE’s agenda. Even amidst this chaos and
tragedy, there are reports of killing and child conscription by the LTTE, one
relating to three girls rescued by the police while being taken to the
LTTE-controlled area at Omanthai. There is no doubt what will happen to many
children in refugee camps where the LTTE has established control. While reports
of a general nature on child conscription are in circulation, the following are
specific instances that appeared on web sites:
Thanabalasingaqm (aged 13) and Gunabalasingam Velkumar (aged 13),
respectively 7th standard at Kondavil Ramakrishna High School and 6th
standard at Urumpirai Saiva Tamil School, both from Urumpirai South, Jaffna:
abducted by the LTTE on 3rd January 2005. SLMM informed (EPDP News).
Kumarasamy Gokulan
(aged 19) and Packiyarasa Dinesh
(aged 18) abducted from Mayilambaveli,
Batticaloa, 3 Jan.05 (EPDP News).
LTTE cadres abducted four youths and a family man on 3
Jan.2005 from among the sea disaster victims sheltered at Uvarmalai Vivekananda
College, Trincomalee (EPDP News).
Our sources gave the following report, which also touches
on the TRO. Ramasamy Yogachandramohan (16)
of Ward 5, Navatcholai, Kumburupiddy, was taken by the LTTE on 8th
December 2004. Three weeks later, in the wake of the disaster, he returned to
the same area north of Trincomalee as a worker for the TRO.
The
LTTE’s principal intention with foreign aid is not the welfare of the people,
but to rebuild its military machine and restore the status quo ante of 25th
December 2004.
For now the
Leader would encourage Sea Tiger Leader Soosai to go public with expressions of
warm gratitude to the Sri Lankan government and donor nations with requests for
dual-purpose equipment. Soosai too may see the best prospect for himself in
rebuilding the Sea Tigers quickly. One is reminded of a similar role played by
the ill-fated former Deputy Leader Mahathaya during the Premadasa honeymoon in
1990.
The last
three years of appeasement have been a travesty of what peace means. The main
task now is to be alert against going down that same road again. The
humanitarian space that was opened up for interaction and reconciliation must
be preserved. This means placing conditions on the LTTE, including human rights
monitoring and open access for humanitarian work. There should be no more
desultory meandering with interim solutions. This opportunity must be grasped
to challenge the Southern polity to come together on a permanent settlement.
The stark choice today is between rehabilitating all the peoples of the
North-East along with democracy, and rehabilitating Tiger terror. There is
nothing in-between.
Given the
plight of thousands of children orphaned and families shattered by this
tragedy, it becomes incumbent on us to tap every potential source of humanity
to give them hope and support. We cannot drag on in an uncertain political
environment with temporary measures. It is criminal complacency that in the end
makes us sadists in what we tolerate in the name of peace or war.
The orphans
in Senthalir Illam, Mullaitivu, whose
lives were abruptly ended, were being reared as sacrificial lambs by the LTTE.
It was tolerated in the name of a grotesque status quo we were told was
the road to peace. Is this the prospect we hold out to the thousands of
children orphaned by the Tsunami?
Scores of
Tamil professionals have flown into Sri Lanka at this critical time to offer
relief to the victims. The world has responded generously. But all these would
be wasted if we go back to the same political machinations, which condemned the
vast majority in the country to an uncertain future. The same machinations
helped a small elite to find greener pastures and thrive by feeding the hatreds
and insecurity of those left behind.
Now is the
hour of challenge for Tamils living abroad to demand an alternative that offers
life and democracy. A little reflection on their own lives and the good fortune
of their children should make it absolutely repellent for them to support a
force, which offers only death and destruction to the coming generation in the
Tamil community.
Will the
leaders in the South persist in their old game of somersaults to undermine each
other purely for power, and constantly betray the people? Will the lofty
sentiments expressed in the immediate aftermath of the devastation turn again
into empty slogans? Cynicism is so entrenched among the people that it would take
concrete measures to convince them that the leaders really intend a benign
change in Sri Lanka’s direction.
The UN and
other international agencies have a grave responsibility to ensure not only
that the aid is distributed and reconstruction begins in earnest without any
discrimination, but also to push for tangible steps towards reconciliation and
movement towards a political solution. This cannot happen by superficial
coordination alone, but by steps to create an environment for people to assert
themselves, and through opportunities for their creative potential to bear
fruit in the political and social arena.
The most
critical question is whether the LTTE would release the children in its ranks
and allow room for dissenting views.
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