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THE
UNIVERSITY TEACHERS
FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, JAFFNA
UTHR(Jaffna)
Sri Lanka
Date of Release : 27th
December 2005
2.In the North: A Menacing Speech
7.Incidents on 20th
December 2005
8.Terror at Home and
Deception Abroad
9.Mishandling of an Explosive Situation
While preparing this briefing we received news of the tragic
and senseless killing of the Hon. Joseph Pararajasingham, MP for Batticaloa,
soon after he received communion with his wife at Christmas mid-night mass.
Christmas eve was also the birthday of his wife Sugunam, who sustained
injuries. The MP collapsed and literally died at the feet of Bishop Kingsley
Swampillai. So far we have only allegations and theories about the identity of
the killers. The LTTE has already accused the Government of complicity in the
killing and awarded the deceased the title of “Maamanithar”. The Sri
Lankan defence establishment for its part has accused the LTTE of the killing
giving reasons which are not farfetched, knowing the LTTE’s present agenda
discussed below. A few anti-LTTE websites justifying the killing have given
prominence to statements purportedly issued by unknown forces such as Seerum
Padai (Hissing Force) and Sennan Padai who claim LTTE-style that
Joseph Pararajasingham was a traitor to the Eastern cause. The killing and justifications adduced yet
again bear testimony to the community’s devaluation of healthy public values
and principles in the face of powerlessness and anger.
Having entered politics in calmer times as a Gandhian and a
federalist and later caught between the vicious violence of the State and that
of its totalitarian Tamil nemesis – the LTTE – Pararajasingham
opportunistically and rhetorically sided with the latter. Nevertheless he
remained likeable and gentle in his dealings with all people. Among sections of
the security forces in Batticaloa who dealt with him, the grief was sincere.
When the LTTE split in 2004, Pararajasingham declined to side with Karuna whom
he had earlier referred to publicly as ‘Mannin Mainthan’ (Prince of our
Land) and ‘Mannin Thalapathy’ (Chief Warrior of our Land). But then as
MP on the TNA national list he remained largely silent and never attacked
Karuna. He was not a significant challenge to anyone and there was no real motive
for anyone to kill him. The symbolism of his murder at Christmas Mass renders
it all the more repugnant.
Under the circumstances, it is even more incumbent on the
Government to find the actual killers. This is particularly so because of the
debilitating uncertainty that surrounds most killings and also the leanings of
Tamil sources that have rushed to justify it. Moreover, we have credible
information that Tamil militant types under threat from the LTTE are housed in
security forces camps in and around Batticaloa and some security officials
expressed concern at more such persons being inducted around October. This is
the dishonourable obverse of appeasing the LTTE. We have constantly argued for
an honest and open solution to the problem, which stemmed from the atrocious
manner in which the Government and Norway dealt with the Karuna split.
People present at the scene of killing identified Pararajasingham’s killer as a tall dark person with short-cropped hair who simply walked out of the church firing into the air. He has so far not been identified, suggesting that he was not locally well-known. The talk in Batticaloa is that the killer who reportedly used a micro-pistol is known as Sittha, but there is no information about his affiliations. Finding out his affiliations cannot be too difficult. The defence authorities have claimed that the deceased MP decided to go to church only after he received a telephone call. It is a circumstance that must await clarification.
The incidents follow rising tensions in the Jaffna peninsula
that have included a series of killings of civilians and attacks on the armed
forces. In interpreting these events the press and even human rights
organisations have tended to follow impressions that have taken root in NGO and
media circles particularly in Colombo. The killings are admittedly difficult to
investigate and the pattern has defied comprehension. True, there are multiple
forces at work, but our understanding of developments is that the direction
towards a very destructive outburst is being determined largely by the LTTE.
The killings would of course require more work and space
than is allowed for in routine journalism. This briefing focuses on the
incidents at the University and some of the contested killings would be dealt
with in a subsequent bulletin. A remarkable meeting called by the LTTE, which
explains a good deal, was held in Pallai on the 23rd of December.
Heads of departments were summoned and addressed by a senior member of the
LTTE. The heads were told that the LTTE would soon capture Jaffna and that
their provocations and scattered attacks on the Army are meant to demoralise
and confuse the security forces. He said that the Army Commander General
Fonseka has promised the President that
he would expand Palaly base and bring Jaffna under control, but they, the LTTE,
would take over Jaffna before that. In the meantime, the speaker said,
government officers need not report for work. About the same time, a front
organisation threatened government workers not to report for work.
Attacks on the Army claiming about twenty lives to date in
Jaffna (rising to 30 after the latest landmine attack in Pt. Pedro) were
steadily mounted following the Leader’s Heroes Day speech a month ago. So far
the Army has largely refrained from firing at civilians. But after each
incident such as a grenade attack on sentry point or the shooting of a soldier,
the Army beating up civilians passing by has become a common occurrence. In
this atmosphere, using its monopoly over the media and the terrorising and
stifling of alternative political voices, the LTTE has charged up a significant
section of the youth. Independent reports say that the LTTE has distributed
grenades and is forcibly or otherwise encouraging youths to attack the Army.
We might mention here that we subsequently received
information that the woman had regular sexual relations with naval personnel,
and further that some persons of unknown affiliation had been seen over about
five days to the incident at the temple near the well where the body was found.
They have not been seen since that fatal night (16th) when the woman
was apparently on her way to the camp. It is up to the Government and the
two-member committee President Rajapakse has appointed to investigate and come
out with the full truth. The delay on the Government’s part is unaccountable.
There is a growing list of Tamil women who were raped and
killed by the security forces or died in consequence of grievous abuse, where
one must say in retrospect that justice has been systematically obstructed and
the perpetrators got off free. The Government’s failure to deal with this has
resulted in much frustration within the community and people feel that there
are many more instances that have not been made public.
Some of the prominent cases since 1996 that led to fatality
are: Krishanthy Coomarasamy (September 1996), Kanthsamy Vijayakumari (Detained
in Vavuniya on her way to Colombo Hospital, gave birth under a tree in pouring
rain and died), Velayuthpillai Rajani (September 1996), Koneswary (Central
Camp, Amparai 1997), Sararthammal (1999).
Among those admitted to hospital is a 5 year old boy with a
broken skull. A naval man had rammed his gun barrel into the back of the boy’s
head and penetrated it.
LTTE propaganda let it be known that the landmine attack was
revenge for the killing of the woman in Pungudutivu. This may seem plausible
from a distance, but not to those in the area who have suffered loss and
displacement and whose lives have been irreparably ruined. A further irony
exposes the hypocrisy.
An army patrol at Parameswara junction near the University
blocked a section of the Palaly Road before the buses could set off to
Pungudutivu. In the altercation some students and civilians were beaten and
stones were also pelted at the Army. Following this a student meeting was
called at Kailasapathy auditorium at 10.00 AM on 19th December. The
meeting was also announced in the Uthayan daily, where LTTE control is
overt.
At that meeting the Vice Chancellor Prof. Mohanadas and the
Dean of Arts Prof. Sivachandran were also on the podium. Gajendran MP was a key
speaker at the meeting. A decision was
taken to present a protest petition to the SLMM. The demonstration left the
University with the Vice Chancellor, the Dean and some staff members at its
head. They were obviously not in control. The demonstration was accompanied by
two trishaws with loud speakers on top blaring slogans such as, ‘Sinhalese
scum get out.’
Emergency regulations in force require that government
permission should be obtained for demonstrations. We verified that the Vice
Chancellor had not spoken to the Army about the demonstration before it set
off. He did speak to the Army two days earlier about army positions around the
University, but not on the day in question. But a point made by many in Jaffna
is that there are still unauthorised demonstrations in the South and the
authorities often turned a blind eye, and are almost never violent. The killing
of the woman was a legitimate issue of concern (even though the University was
understandably silent on routine killings by the LTTE). The demonstration went
the hundred and fifty yards from the University to Parameswara junction turned
right into Palaly road and ran into a patrol of about 40 to 50 soldiers at the
Parameswara junction who blocked their way.
The Vice Chancellor, the Dean and some other staff members
sat down on the road. Other staff members present felt that they should have
gone up to the Army with their hands up, identified themselves and explained to
them. As it was there was no communication between the Army and the staff members
in the lead. We have been told that stones were thrown at the Army at this
point. But we could not verify from where they were thrown. The stone throwing
is also confirmed by the SLMM statement, which goes onto emphasise that the
demonstration was not a peaceful one.
Following the landmine attacks earlier this month, army
patrolling of the main roads has been intensified. There is an army camp about
three quarters of a mile down Palaly Road towards Jaffna town, but there was
only a small contingent of the Army at Parameswara Junction at that time and no
army vehicles. Reinforcements and armoured vehicles came about 45 minutes after
the incident.
The soldiers moved forward, some with sticks, and tried to
push the demonstrators back. To this end, they fired up into the air and also
at the ground. As far as we could establish, they did not fire at the
demonstrators as some media reports claimed earlier. One lecturer,
Perinpanathan, felt blood coming out of his thigh due to something hitting him.
This may be a fragment resulting from soldiers firing into the ground. He was
admitted to the hospital, which did not find evidence of a gunshot injury and
soon discharged him. The soldiers also attacked the demonstrators with rifle
butts. Among those beaten was Prof. Sivachandran, who received a blow on his
back from a stick or a rifle butt. Prof. Mohanadas who was seated on the road
shouted in Sinhalese that he was the Vice Chancellor. The soldiers scolded him
and pushed him into a shop and asked him to sit down. But he was not beaten.
Some staff members who were at the head and had reached the army patrol were
also not beaten.
The police had occupied a house in KKS road and a police
party came along Kaladdy Road in a vehicle, tuned into Parameswera Rd. and went
into a house in a lane opposite the University Library to deliver a cheque as
rent. They went to the house of Eeswarathas, a registrar in the Jaffna
Kachcheri. The police party was told that they were only tenants and asked them
to deliver the cheque to Dr. Sivarajah’s daughter in the same lane. The police
party was observed and a crowd gathered at the top of the lane and blocked the
police from leaving. The agitators threw stones at the Police and attempted to
set fire to the Police vehicle. 70% of the agitators were persons from outside
the University and included students from the Kokkuvil Technical College. The
policemen took positions and fired into the air and radioed Jaffna and Kopay
for reinforcements. Emergency 999, a small police party, came there in 15
minutes time, but was insufficient to handle the crowd. Some LTTE men were
present on the scene and took off on their motorcycles as soon as the police
reinforcement made its appearance. The mob continued to pelt stones at the
police and kept them at bay. By firing into the air the Police also kept the
mob about 100 yards away from the Jeep. A larger group of 200 policemen arrived
45 minutes later and moved up Parameswara Road from the junction on foot firing
into the air. The crowd scattered.
Illampirai, a university employee, probably alarmed by the
firing, lay down on the road and got hurt by the police party that in advancing
fast, ran over him. The same Illampirai as a student had thrown stones from
Abirami Hotel at the Indian Army during the February 1989 incident, also at
Parameswara junction, where two students died of gun shot injuries. The Police
detained Illampirai, a student and an outsider. Illampirai and the student were
released.
The incident should be seen in the overall context and purpose of the continuing provocations in Jaffna and the speech in Pallai cited above. This is not an Intifada as some commentators have described. Nor is it a spontaneous people’s movement, but is something orchestrated with a military agenda, the consequences of which the people are painfully aware, but are in terror of expressing. Against this silence enforced by fear, the media and even human rights organisations are picking up planted noises as the voice of the people.
The Army, which is virtually Sinhalese, in trying to deal
with a reality where the LTTE has since 2002 built up a network of saboteurs
and agent provocateurs, faces a major challenge. Thanks to the one-sided CFA, which
placed no tangible obligations on the LTTE, it forged this climate of anarchy
by destroying even the limited political space that was available earlier.
Going by the recent record, there will be random and devious attacks and
continual killings of so-called LTTE supporters and captive Pongu Thamil stars
in Jaffna, after which well orchestrated accusations will be made against the
Army and paramilitary forces (Kootuppadai or Joint Forces in current
propaganda jargon).
All this is now part of the tested arsenal of the LTTE. Soon
after the IPKF’s arrival in 1987, the LTTE ambushed four priests from
Assemblies of God in Uduvil and then went all over Jaffna announcing that the
ENDLF – the IPKF’s so-called 5th column – was responsible for the
atrocity and organised public protests. There are verified instances of the
same strategy at work today (see the last Bulletin). Many reputedly “LTTE
supporters” (whom the LTTE used but never trusted) face the real danger of
assassination, which is then credited to ‘paramilitary forces’, followed by the
award of the gratuitous title of ‘Tamil National Patriot’. To the LTTE’s
advantage the Army and most other groups lack the credibility to counter this
strategy, as they too have been involved in some barbaric killings.
The people themselves tremble in fear of speaking to their
neighbour and fear that no communication is private. The LTTE-controlled media
has become the only source of information even for an incident in their
neighbourhood. Consequently all is confusion, among the people, the Army, the
other groups, the international media and, not least, the international
community! The Army’s long-practised counter assassination methods would only
further confuse and confound the anarchy. The only party that is clear about
what it intends to reap is the LTTE intelligence wing headed by Pottu Amman!
The LTTE wants the people to be harassed , beaten and killed
by the Army. Our monitoring of LTTE
behaviour from the early 1980s has accumulated enough evidence, which shows that
the thrust of LTTE politics is never to defend the people or secure their
welfare, but to work towards making them fodder for military gains and
propaganda! Likewise, the security
forces, which treat all the Tamils as Tigers and unleash their terror, create
fertile ground for LTTE recruitment and its style of politics, whose end is
utter ruin.
Our reports have continually highlighted the dangers in
store when the so-called peace process culminates in pre-ordained failure! A
peace process, which could not change the pernicious dynamism or undermine the
logic of terror, cannot be sustained and was bound to hit the shoals.
Unfortunately, many leading Southern NGOs and the facilitators have paid scant
regard to these warnings and have fuelled and legitimised LTTE politics at
others’ expense in the hope of transforming it by appeasement. What the
civilians want is a permanent political solution and withdrawal of the Army to
barracks so that they could lead normal civilian lives.
Why did the LTTE withdraw from the Norway-sponsored talks in
2003? Even during the Kumaratunge presidency they orchestrated war hysteria and
were systematically provoking the Army after the 2004 Heroes Day speech, only
to be stopped short by the tsunami disaster (Bulletin No.37). All along the
LTTE’s unmistakable strategy was to prolong an uncertain situation while
obstructing a political solution. Knowing the nature of the Sri Lankan state,
its armed forces and the latent chauvinism of the Sinhalese polity, they are
sure that there would come an opportune moment, where the Army could be
portrayed as an occupying force terrorising the civilian population and the
Sinhalese leaders as the extremists who would never accommodate reasonable
Tamil demands. Mark the ease with
which the international media was ready to portray President Rajapakse as an
obdurate extremist opposed to federalism, while turning a blind eye to the
LTTE’s long record of running away from negotiations whenever a federal
solution was within reach – the last time it was 6 months after the December
2002 Oslo Accord, after which it spurned all entreaties to return to talks.
Against this reality, the crucial question is whether there
has been any qualitative shift in Sri Lankan Army to respond creatively to the
present challenge? While the Army has
shown some restraint, the behaviour of the Navy has been utterly reprehensible,
doing exactly what the LTTE wanted, living in its own world as though the
people did not exist. The ground situation meanwhile moves dangerously close to
what prevailed in the 1980s and early 1990s – one of seething resentment
against the Government.
Unfortunately statements coming from leading persons in
charge of security have tragically misread the task at hand. Their methods
would further alienate the Tamils, isolate the security forces from the
community and bear them to the brink of losing their balance completely. What
is needed is a clear policy and actions, such as a proper investigation of the
incidents in Pungudutivu and Pesalai that would build public confidence in the
security forces as the guardians of their best interests.
The Army in Jaffna had all this while failed to open a
channel to the University authorities to engage and deal with them. Instead, a
routine patrol was allowed to handle the recent protest near the University.
This reveals severe professional shortcomings and insensitivity. In the event
of stones being thrown, why was there no senior army officer to identify the
Vice Chancellor and deal with the situation differently? Why has the Government
and the Defence Command failed to make a public commitment to inquire into the
loss of civilian life in Pesalai and convince the people that the culprits
would be punished?
The understanding of the security challenge and the nature
of the conflict possessed by the present Army Commander and the recently
appointed advisor to Minister of Defence, former DIG Kotakadeniya, does not
give any confidence that they have the capacity to deal with LTTE’s agenda
creatively. For the formers role in the East during the early 1990s and the
latter’s in Colombo during the mid-1990s see Reports 4, 7 and the book The
Arrogance of Power... Increasing the number of soldiers on random combing
operations, who then in one form or the other relieve their anger and
frustration on the ordinary civilians, is not going to work at all.
While security is important both in Colombo and in Jaffna
the methods used should not harass or alienate innocent civilians. General
Larry Wijeratne had managed to understand the nature of the problem and
consciously worked towards building a community relationship, keeping in mind
that he is a Sinhalese from the South. Knowing the plight of the people and
their dilemmas he carried out his duties as a conscientious and intelligent
soldier. He was threat to the LTTE’s agenda and thus became the first middle
ranking army officer to be targeted by an LTTE suicide bomber at his farewell
function. The example of the late General Larry Wijeratne in Pt. Pedro should
be studied with care.
But in order to arrest the present trend towards total war, a clear signal must come from the international community to make the LTTE understand the futility of prolonging war at the expense of the Tamil community. While insisting that it should work meaningfully towards a permanent political settlement, all available levers should be used to express the international community’s contempt for its politics in no uncertain terms.
The Government needs to set up oversight mechanisms with the
participation of community leaders to restrain the Army and the Navy. Moreover,
they should take urgent initiatives to build consensus in the South regarding
the final political settlement and demand that the LTTE engage with them in
this endeavour.
The situation further demands of us to think about a
possible international monitoring mechanism with enforcement power through
military coercion when necessary. The manner in which the situation is
developing, this may become the only means of securing the peace and defeating
the LTTE’s agenda, which is nothing short of destroying the Tamil community
utterly. It has indeed been a Black Christmas.
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